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ABSTRACT 
We examine the incidence of the corporate income tax. Tax incidence theory suggests that 
corporate income taxation affects the supply of capital, resulting in changes to output, demand for 
supplies and demand for labor (Harberger 1962). Prior studies suggest that shareholders ultimately 
bear incidence (Gravelle and Smetters 2006). Based on these studies, we first hypothesize that tax 
changes affect firms’ equity financing, consistent with taxes affecting the supply of capital. Next, 
we hypothesize that tax changes affect firms’ investment. Third, we hypothesize that consumers, 
suppliers, employees in addition to shareholders all bear the incidence of the corporate income tax. 
We also hypothesize that non-state governments bear incidence because firms will avoid more 
(less) non-state taxes in response to state tax rate increases (decreases). We use difference-in-
differences regressions with state corporate income tax changes as plausibly exogenous shocks to 
test our hypotheses. We find that equity issuances and investment are both responsive to state tax 
rate increases, but not decreases. Similarly, we find that consumers, suppliers, employees and non-
state governments bear incidence following state tax rate increases but not decreases. We also 
perform several cross-sectional tests and find results consistent with our hypotheses. In an 
additional test, we find that large tax decreases lead to higher wages, suggesting that labor captures 
some of the benefits of a tax decrease. Our study contributes to the literature on the incidence of 
the corporate income tax. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Who bears the costs and benefits of the corporate income tax? Policymakers, 
practitioners, and academics have grappled with the incidence consequences of the corporate 
income tax but have found mixed results. Recent commentary echoes this confusion and suggests 
that corporate income tax incidence remains an enigma (Auerbach 2006).The classic work on tax 
incidence, Harberger (1962), suggests that the incidence of the corporate income tax should be 
singularly borne by capital (i.e. shareholders). In other words, shareholders should bear the costs 
of a tax rate increase and receive the benefits of a tax rate decrease. Subsequent empirical work 
is consistent with this result to a large extent (e.g., Gravelle 2013; Mankiw 2006). However, 
recent studies suggest that some of the burdens and benefits fall on employees (labor) 
(Arulampalam, Devereux and Maffini 2010; Cochrane 2017; Mankiw 2017; Fuest, Peichl and 
Sieghloch 2018).  
 In this study, we aim to identify who bears the costs and benefits of state corporate 
income taxes. Prior literature primarily focuses on the effects of corporate taxation on the taxed 
firm’s shareholders and employees (Fuest et al. 2018).1 We expand the potential set of 
stakeholders that bear incidence to consumers, suppliers and other governments, while also 
incorporating employees and the taxed firm’s shareholders. To our knowledge, studies 
examining corporate income tax incidence on suppliers, governments and consumers are sparse. 
                                                          
1 In addition, our study is consistent with prior literature on implicit taxes but is distinct in that we focus on changes 
in input prices and quantity demanded rather than pre-tax returns. Contrastingly, implicit taxes focus on the implicit 
taxes on inputs that corporations use and the resulting effects on pre-tax returns (e.g. Wilkie 1992, Jennings, Weaver 
and Mayew 2012). For example, Jennings et al. (2012) find evidence consistent with corporate taxes reducing pre-
tax returns and suggest this decrease is due to higher input prices. Contrastingly, we focus on the consequences of 
the corporate income tax to the taxed firm’s stakeholders. That is, we focus on the changes in input prices and 
quantity demanded induced by corporate tax changes. Thus, our study is consistent with studies on implicit taxes but 
is distinct in that we focus on changes in input prices and quantity demanded rather than pre-tax returns.  
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(Goolsbee 1998 and  Kopczuk, Marion, Muehlegger and Slemrod 2013 examine suppliers, but 
focus on non-corporate tax incidence). Furthermore, prior literature hardly explores these 
questions using firm-level data which is often richer than aggregate data and allows for more 
powerful tests. Thus, we improve on prior studies by expanding the set of examined stakeholders 
and by using detailed financial statement information.  
 Consistent with the public economics literature, we define tax incidence as the change in 
welfare due to a change in taxes (Fullerton and Metcalf 2002; Black, Hashimzade and Myles 
2012). Therefore, incidence may result from either 1) a change in the transaction price of a good, 
1) a change in the quantity transacted of a good or 3) both. For example, assume the corporate 
income tax results in incidence on consumers.  Consumers will 1) face a higher price to purchase 
the good, 2) purchase fewer goods or 3) some combination of 1) and 2). In any of these three 
cases, consumers lose welfare after the imposition of the tax. Consequently, we would conclude 
that the consumer bears the incidence of the tax. 
Our hypotheses are consistent with the theory found in Harberger (1962) and reviewed in 
Auerbach (2006) but differ in that we include consumers, suppliers and other governments as 
potential bearers of incidence.2 Contrastingly, Harberger (1962) and most of the theories 
reviewed in Auerbach (2006) analyze incidence effects on only labor and capital. We 
hypothesize that consumers, suppliers, and other governments in addition to labor (employees) 
and capital (shareholders) bear some incidence from state corporate income tax rate increases 
because a corporate income tax rate increase reduces the after-tax returns to shareholders, which 
results in a higher cost of capital. As a result, firms issue less equity, reduce their output and 
                                                          
2 Auerbach (2006) reviews several theories on the incidence of the corporate income tax. All of the reviewed 
theories assume or conclude that capital flows to the taxed sector decrease to varying degrees due to the tax. 
However, the incidence of the corporate income tax on shareholders depends on portfolio allocations in equilibrium, 
substitution between equity and debt and the shareholder-level tax rate. 
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demand less supplies and labor. Prices rise because of the decreased output. Supply costs and 
labor costs decline because of the decreased demand. As a result, consumers, suppliers, 
employees and shareholders bear incidence.3 Moreover, firms will take more aggressive tax 
positions (e.g., avoid more taxes) to offset an increase in the statutory tax rate. Therefore, other 
governments will also bear incidence.  
Additionally, we examine whether incidence is asymmetric. Specifically, we examine 
whether these same set of stakeholders obtain the benefits of state corporate income tax rate 
decreases. A reduction in statutory tax rates increases the return to shareholders for a given 
amount of pretax income, reducing the cost of equity. Thus, firms will raise capital by issuing 
equity to increase investment, hire more workers, and purchase inventory. By doing so, firms 
will produce more goods and therefore increase profits. This increased demand results in more 
workers hired at a higher wage and more supplies purchased at a higher price. Consequently, 
suppliers and employees receive the benefits of a tax decrease. Moreover,  firms’ increased 
output will result in lower selling prices. Thus, consumers experience an increase in their welfare 
(i.e., they would receive some of the benefits of a tax decrease) because they purchase more 
goods at a lower price. Firms are also predicted to take less risk in avoiding non-state taxes 
because state tax rate decreases reduce the marginal benefits of tax avoidance. If firms reduce tax 
avoidance in response to a state tax rate decrease, then non-state governments will have 
benefitted from the state tax rate decrease.4  
                                                          
3 Our explanation abstracts away from important assumptions for the sake of simplicity. However, we note that the 
mobilities of capital and labor and price elasticities facing the firm will also affect incidence. 
4 Tax incidence need not be symmetric. That is, stakeholders that bear the costs of tax rate increases need not 
necessarily recoup the gains of tax decreases. Shareholders might prefer to withhold the benefits of lower corporate 
taxes for themselves. Moreover, firms might be unwilling or unable to renegotiate contractual obligations that 
provide favorable prices for inputs (such as supply or labor contracts) that were struck under the assumption of 
higher taxes. Thus, tax incidence might exhibit asymmetric behavior with respect to increases and decreases.  
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We begin by identifying whether state corporate income tax rate increases reduce equity 
issuances and whether tax rate decreases increase equity issuances. Incidence literature assumes 
that tax changes affect the provision of capital, resulting in supply shocks that change prices and, 
ultimately, economic incidence. We test whether this assumption is empirically valid. To do so, 
we perform a firm-level difference-in-differences regression using changes to state tax rates as 
plausibly exogenous shocks. We hypothesize that firms issue less equity following state 
corporate income tax rate increases and issue more equity following state corporate income tax 
decreases.5 
Second, we test whether tax changes affect investment. Incidence theory assumes that 
changes in equity issuances alters investment, thus affecting the demand for various inputs. 
These demand changes result in incidence. Thus, we test another important assumption of 
incidence theory by analyzing whether state tax changes alter investment. We hypothesize that 
firms invest less following state tax rate increases and invest more following state tax decreases.  
We use firm-level income statements to identify incidence on the various stakeholders. 
The income statement captures the following identity:   
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 = 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 − 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼  
If state tax rate increases are associated with changes to the firm’s income statement 
accounts, this implies a change to the welfare of the stakeholder related to that account. We 
attribute stakeholder welfare to the income statement as follows: revenues measure incidence on 
consumer/customers, cost of goods sold expense measures incidence on suppliers, sales, general 
                                                          
5 Tax rate changes can induce firms to trade-off debt for equity or vice versa. For example, tax rate increases induce 
firms to substitute debt for equity because debt is tax-deductible (Heider and Ljungqvist 2015 demonstrate that firms 
issue more debt following state tax rate increases). Thus, firms might mitigate the impact of a higher cost of equity 
by issuing debt. However, increased debt issuances will increase the cost of debt. Overall, firms’ cost of capital (i.e. 
the cost of debt and equity combined) will be higher and they will issue less financing. Thus, firms will produce less 
output and incidence might be borne by any of our proffered stakeholders.  
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and administrative expense measures incidence on employees, non-state income taxes measure 
incidence on non-state governments, and net income measures the incidence on shareholders.6 
As an example, if shareholders bore the full burden of a tax rate increase we would expect to see 
a reduction in net income associated with the increase but no changes to the other accounts.7 
Similarly, we would conclude that consumers bear tax incidence if a state tax rate increase 
results in a revenue decrease.8 
We use state tax changes rather than federal tax changes for several reasons. First, state-
level corporate income taxes offer more cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in statutory 
tax rates than federal-level corporate income taxes. Second, we use state statutory tax rate 
changes in our difference-in-differences regressions as plausibly exogenous shocks to firm tax 
liabilities. By focusing on plausibly exogenous shocks, we reduce the likelihood that observed 
responses in outcome variables represent the effects of omitted variables.9 Further, we rely on 
the fact that not all states change their tax rates at the same time for our difference-in-differences 
tests. Thus, we increase power and reduce potential bias by using state tax expense. 
We estimate difference-in-differences regressions on a sample which contains firms 
experiencing state tax rate increases and decreases to examine whether tax incidence is 
asymmetric with respect to increases and decreases. In these regressions, our treated group 
comprises firms headquartered in states that increased or decreased corporate income tax rates in 
                                                          
6 We scale each of our dependent variables by lagged total assets. 
7 This analysis applies symmetrically to state tax decreases. 
8 If revenues increase (and the increase is significantly different from zero), we would still infer that consumers bear 
incidence because prices rose and output fell. Per Harberger (1962), taxes reduce returns to shareholders, resulting in 
less capital raised and less output. Lower output raises prices. If the magnitude of the price rise exceeds the 
magnitude of the output drop, revenues would still rise. Therefore, the change in revenues is a function of elasticities 
in the market. 
9 State tax changes are not purely exogenous because they are generally induced by politics, local economic 
conditions, etc. However, state tax changes need only follow a random walk for difference-in-differences 
regressions to estimate average treatment effects. Heider and Ljungqvist (2016) find evidence that state tax changes 
follow a random walk.  
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the current year or a prior year. Our control sample consists of firms headquartered in states that 
have not yet raised or decreased corporate income taxes and also firms that will never experience 
a corporate income tax rate increase or decrease during our sample period.  We then perform a 
staggered difference-in-differences regression to identify the marginal effect of a state tax change 
on the various income statement line items.10 
Our first results are consistent with state corporate income tax rate increases decreasing 
equity issuances. Specifically, we find that equity issuances (the number of shares sold by firm i 
in year t multiplied by the selling price of those shares) and net equity issuances (equity 
issuances reduced by share repurchases) are negatively and significantly associated with state tax 
rate increases in a difference-in-differences framework. Therefore, our results support the 
assumption that increases to the corporate income tax reduce the supply of equity capital to 
firms. Interestingly, we find that the relationship is asymmetric: while tax rate increases reduce 
equity issuances, tax decreases have no significant association with equity issuances. Thus, our 
results suggest that firms do not respond to state tax decreases by issuing more equity.  
Next, we find that state tax rate increases are negatively associated with investment. 
Specifically, we find that state tax rate increases significantly reduce capital expenditures and 
research and development. Along with our prior results, this result is consistent with tax rate 
increases increasing the cost of equity capital and decreasing equity financing which reduces 
firm-level investment. Thus, this result is consistent with traditional corporate income tax 
incidence theory (e.g. Harberger 1962). However, we do not find an association between tax 
decreases and either of our investment variables. Thus, our results are asymmetric again.  
                                                          
10 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) employ the same approach to test whether governance shocks affect managerial 
preferences.  
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Next, we implement difference-in-differences regressions around state corporate income 
tax rate increases to identify incidence. We find results consistent with consumers, suppliers, and 
employees bearing the burden of the corporate income tax. Specifically, we find that sales, 
COGS,  SG&A, and non-state taxes decrease following an increase to state tax rates.  We find no 
association between state tax rate increases and shareholder welfare (earnings). 
In these same regressions, we also test for incidence asymmetry. Specifically, we 
examine whether state tax decreases enhance the welfare of various stakeholders. We find no 
association between state tax decreases and revenues, cost of goods sold, SG&A, non-state taxes 
or earnings. Thus, our results are consistent with consumers, suppliers, non-state governments 
and shareholders receiving none of the benefits of a corporate income tax decrease. Interestingly, 
our results are antithetical to theory in the area (e.g. Harberger 1962; Auerbach 2006; Mankiw 
2006), which suggest that shareholders bear most, if not all, of the incidence of the corporate 
income tax.11  
We suspect that our main findings of incidence asymmetry may be partially driven by 
small tax decreases. Tax cuts may have little or no effect on our various dependent variables 
because they are mostly small in magnitude.12  To address this possibility, we perform the same 
difference-in-differences regressions but use only state tax rate decreases of 1% or more. With 
these specifications, we find null results except that corporate income tax decreases are 
significantly associated with increases in SG&A. This result is consistent with employees and/or 
other suppliers benefitting from tax rate decreases. Thus, employees and/or suppliers seem to 
                                                          
11 We attribute differences between our study and theoretical results to assumptions in those studies. For example, 
Harberger (1962) assumes perfect mobility of labor. Thus, employees avoid the costs of a tax rate increase by 
merely switching jobs. However, labor is not perfectly mobile (e.g. Fuest et al. 2018, among others). Thus, workers 
face costs when demand for labor decreases due to tax rate increases.  
12 Small tax decreases may also explain asymmetric results found in other studies that use state tax changes (Heider 
and Ljungqvist 2015; Ljungqvist, Zhang and Zuo 2017). 
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suffer when corporate tax rates rise but benefit when corporate tax rates fall. Contrastingly, other 
stakeholders only seem to suffer when corporate tax rates rise, with no commensurate benefits 
when corporate tax rates fall. 
We perform one cross-sectional test for each stakeholder for state tax rate increases. First, 
we hypothesize that tax rate increases reduce revenues more when the firm operates in an elastic 
product market compared to an inelastic product market. Second, we hypothesize that market 
power increases incidence on suppliers by nudging output levels towards monopsonistic levels 
following tax rate increases. Third, we hypothesize that union membership increases incidence 
on labor because tax rate increases reduce economic rents captured by union members via 
bargaining while also decreasing the demand for labor. Fourth, we hypothesize that tax rate 
increases lead to more incidence on non-state governments among firms engaging in risky tax 
avoidance because tax rate increases will encourage firms with high tax risk tolerance to avoid 
non-state taxes. Thus, firms engaging in risky tax avoidance will increase non-state tax 
avoidance more than firms engaging in less risky tax avoidance following tax rate increases. 
Finally, we hypothesize that shareholders at financially constrained firms suffer less from tax 
rate increases compared to shareholders at other firms because tax changes should not alter the 
financing and investment of constrained firms as they are already unable to access external 
financing for investment. In these tests, we also include state tax rate decreases. We do not offer 
directional predictions on tax rate decreases because we did not find significant results for 
decreases in our main tests. Our cross-sectional results are broadly consistent with our 
hypotheses.  
 This study contributes to the literature on tax incidence by providing a comprehensive 
examination of the effects of corporate income tax rate changes on firm stakeholders. To our 
 
 
9 
knowledge, we are the first to examine the effects of tax rate changes on equity issuances. Thus, 
our study is the first to test an important assumption of corporate income tax incidence theory. 
Moreover, we expand traditional incidence analyses by examining the effects of tax changes on a 
broader set of stakeholders. While prior literature identifies incidence effects only on 
shareholders and, to a lesser extent, employees, this study aims to identify effect on various 
corporate stakeholders. To our knowledge, our study is the first to examine corporate income tax 
incidence effects on suppliers (Goolsbee 1998 and Kopczuk et al. 2013 examine non-income tax 
incidence on suppliers). Furthermore, this study is the first to use firm-level data to identify tax 
incidence on shareholders, employees and consumers.  
 Perhaps most importantly, our study provides evidence to policymakers on corporate 
income tax incidence. Policymakers debated changes to the corporate income tax prior to and 
following the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017. As commenters have noted, 
incidence was central to these debates because policymakers likely did not intend to impose costs 
on non-shareholders, but did hope benefits would reach these same stakeholders (Mankiw 2017). 
Thus, we hope this study helps predict the consequences of TCJA’s corporate income tax rate 
decrease and assists policymakers understand the consequences of future corporate income tax 
changes.  
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Economic tax incidence refers to welfare changes in a market when a tax is imposed on 
any party in that market (Black, Hashimadze and Myles 2012). In other words, tax incidence 
refers to extra costs imposed on or benefits received by a party in a market due to changes in tax 
rates on any party in the same market. For example, firms may reduce output and raise sales 
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prices in response to an increase in tax rates. In this case, consumers bear tax incidence because 
they pay a higher price and consume fewer units due to the increase in taxes.  
In this study, we explore the incidence of the corporate income tax by analyzing changes 
in state corporate income taxes. We hypothesize that firms pass on tax incidence to various 
stakeholders because the corporate income tax reduces the after-tax returns of shareholders in a 
firm facing a tax rate increase.13 Consequently, shareholders will withdraw their capital from the 
firm and instead invest in a firm that does not face a tax rate increase. By doing so, shareholders 
deprive the firm facing a state tax rate increase of one of its production inputs. Thus, firms 
decrease their investment and reduce their demand for inputs such as inventory and labor. The 
prices and the market-clearing quantities of inputs should fall as a result of decreased demand, 
resulting in tax incidence on these various inputs. Moreover, the firm will reduce its overall 
output, resulting in decreased supply to the market and higher prices. Under this theory, 
shareholders, suppliers, consumers and labor might all bear incidence.   
Symmetrically, income tax decreases should benefit shareholders, suppliers, consumers 
and employees because tax cuts increase after-tax returns to shareholders. Therefore, 
shareholders should provide capital to firms with low tax rates by purchasing such firms’ equity. 
At the margin, firms should increase their investment because of the increased access to capital. 
At the same time, firms should purchase more supplies and employ more labor to increase 
production. As a result, consumers benefit from increased supply and lower prices. Increased 
sales also increase profits. Therefore, tax decreases benefit consumers, suppliers, labor and 
shareholders.  
                                                          
13 Our theory is consistent with conventional theory on the corporate income tax incidence. See e.g. Harberger 
(1962); Gravelle (2013). 
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We acknowledge that our treatment of incidence is somewhat incomplete because we are 
unable to identify price elasticities. Price elasticities refer to the changes in demand or supply 
associated with a change in price. In other words, price elasticities represent the sensitivity of 
demand and supply to changes in price. Corporate income tax incidence depends on relative 
elasticities in the markets between firms and stakeholders (i.e. in the market between firms and 
consumers, the market between firms and suppliers, etc.). Intuitively, if demand is highly 
sensitive to price (i.e. elastic) while supply is not (i.e. inelastic), an increase in the price of a 
good will result in 1) a substantial decrease in quantity demanded but very little decrease in 
quantity supplied. Moreover, if demand (supply) is perfectly inelastic, then the full amount of the 
tax will be borne by producers (consumers). In this study, we are unable to identify elasticities, 
as are most incidence studies (e.g. Hassett and Mathur 2015; Fuest et al. 2018). For example, if 
demand for labor by firms is relatively elastic and the supply of labor to firms is inelastic, a 
corporate tax rate increase would result in incidence on labor and little incidence to the firm (and 
to its shareholders, ultimately). Thus, to the extent we identify incidence on a stakeholder, we 
infer that 1) the firm passes on taxes to the stakeholder and 2) stakeholder elasticity is relatively 
high.  
Our study is closely related to the literature on implicit taxes. Implicit taxes refer to lower 
pre-tax investment returns to tax-favored assets (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew 
and Shevlin 2015). Implicit taxes arise because taxation of an asset causes the prices of untaxed 
assets to rise. In equilibrium, the expected pre-tax returns of untaxed assets falls due to this price 
increase. This decrease is referred to as an implicit tax. Several studies examine whether 
corporations face implicit taxes due to variation in the tax treatments of production inputs. For 
example, Wilkie (1992) finds evidence consistent with tax subsidies being associated with lower 
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pre-tax earnings. Jennings et al. (2012) find that implicit taxes faced by corporations decreased 
following the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  
Our study and incidence analyses generally are consistent with this literature on implicit 
taxes faced by corporations. If we find that corporate income taxation affects input prices, we 
could infer that explicit corporate income taxation imposes implicit taxes on inputs because their 
prices rise (Chyz, Luna and Smith 2016). In this spirit, Jennings et al. (2012) note that implicit 
taxes facing a corporation are “…a special case of the incidence of corporate income taxes.” 
However, studies focusing on the implicit taxes faced by corporations are different from 
incidence studies because implicit tax studies focus on changes in pre-tax returns to firms while 
we focus on changes in returns to various stakeholders in the firm. 
Theoretically, we examine incidence on various stakeholders because firms contract with 
each of these stakeholders. Therefore, firms pass incidence onto any of these parties. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that a corporation can be viewed as a “nexus” of contracts between 
various stakeholders of the firm – shareholders, labor, suppliers, customers, governments (and 
perhaps other stakeholders, though we do not consider them in this study). Therefore, each of 
these various stakeholders will bear incidence if the corporate income tax affects demand for 
their good or service. 
We begin by testing whether state tax changes affect equity issuances, as assumed by 
many incidence models (Harberger 1962; Gravelle 2013). We expect corporate income taxes to 
affect corporate after-tax returns. Therefore, in equilibrium, firms’ equity issuances should vary 
with corporate income taxes because firms with high corporate income taxes have less access to 
equity capital than untaxed firms at the margin. Thus, corporate income tax rate increases should 
decrease equity issuances because investors should be marginally less willing to supply capital to 
 
 
13 
firms experiencing a tax rate increase. Symmetrically, corporate income tax cuts should decrease 
firms’ cost of equity and increase equity issuance.14 15 Thus, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Firms increase (decrease) equity issuances following state corporate income tax 
decreases (increases). 
Second, we hypothesize that firms’ investment change following state tax rate increases. 
Incidence theory posits that changes in equity issuances affect marginal firm-level investment 
which reduces input demand and output supply, thus leading to incidence. Thus, we expect 
marginal investment to decrease following tax rate increases and increase following tax 
decreases.  Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2:  Firms increase (decrease) investment following state corporate income tax decreases 
(increases).  
Our next hypotheses posit that the various stakeholders identified above bear incidence. 
First, consumers are an important stakeholder in the firm because they commercially transact 
with firms. Consequently, we expect consumers to suffer when corporate income taxes rise and 
benefit when corporate income taxes fall because a tax rate increase reduces output to consumers 
and raises prices while a decrease increases output and lowers prices. Prior literature explores tax 
incidence on consumers (e.g. Fullerton and Metcalf 2002).16 For example, McClure (1981) 
considers the incidence of state corporate income taxes in a theoretical setting. He argues that 
state residents bear the incidence of the tax – as workers, landowners, capital owners and, to an 
                                                          
14 We do not examine the relation between corporate income taxes and debt financing because prior studies 
demonstrate a positive relation between taxes and corporate debt usage (e.g. Heider and Ljungqvist 2015; Graham 
2003 provides a review).  
15 Firms will not fully substitute changes in equity issuance with debt issuance because increased debt imposes costs. 
For example, firms will not perfectly substitute debt for equity following a tax rate increase because high levels of 
debt increase bankruptcy costs (as noted in Graham 2003). Moreover, increased demand for debt will increase the 
cost of debt supplied to firms. Thus, overall financing will fall following tax rate increases.  
16 Firms will not raise their prices to recover lost after-tax profits in response to a tax rate increase in equilibrium. If 
firms did so, their price would be higher than their competitors’ prices and they would be unable to sell their output.  
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extent, consumers. Empirically, Gordon (1967) and Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) find that 
firms pass on the full burden of a corporate income tax to consumers. More recently, Hassett and 
Mathur (2015) use a spatial model to find little incidence on consumers. Notably, these studies 
use aggregate data to identify any effects. Contrastingly, we use firm-level data and natural 
experiments to identify effects on consumers. Thus, our tests should be more powerful than those 
used prior studies on consumer incidence. Our hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: Consumers bear the incidence of the corporate income tax. 
A similar rationale applies to employees. Harberger (1962) theoretically demonstrates 
that labor doesn’t bear incidence because labor can costlessly shift to untaxed sectors where 
demand for labor is unbounded. However, empirical results are inconsistent with Harberger’s 
theoretical results. Arulampalam et al. (2012) finds evidence that labor does bear some tax costs 
in a European setting. We expect labor to bear incidence because our theory predicts that 
changes in taxes affect investment which changes the demand for labor. For example, if 
corporate income taxes rise, firms should invest less because they are less able to access equity 
financing. Thus, they employ fewer workers or pay workers less, resulting in incidence on labor. 
This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H4: Employees bear the incidence of the corporate income tax. 
Suppliers are an external stakeholder in the firm and thus should bear incidence. For 
example, Goolsbee (1998) finds that firms pass on the tax benefits from an investment tax credit 
to suppliers while Kopczuk et al. 2013 find that excise tax incidence is borne along a supply 
chain. We use cost of goods sold to proxy for supplier welfare. Similarly, Brown, Fee and 
Thomas (2009) suggest that firms pass on costs associated with leveraged buy outs (not taxes) to 
suppliers in the form of reduced cost of goods sold. In our setting, we expect firms to respond to 
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tax rate increases (decreases) by reducing (increasing) their demand for supplies. Therefore, the 
price of supplies and the quantity sold should decline (rise), leading to incidence on suppliers.  
H5: Suppliers bear the incidence of the corporate income tax. 
We also hypothesize that firms pay less (more) non-state income taxes when their state 
income taxes increase (decrease) because increased (decrease) state income taxes alter the 
optimal level of non-state tax avoidance. For example, firms should find that saving cash by 
avoiding non-state taxes is more valuable following an increase in state taxes than it was prior to 
the state tax rate increase. As a result, firms will bear increased risk in their non-state tax 
avoidance to ensure that they avoid more cash taxes. Therefore, we expect firms to reduce their 
non-state tax payments in response to state tax rate increases. Symmetrically, we expect firms to 
pay more in non-state taxes when their state taxes decrease. When state taxes are low, firms 
benefit less from taking risk to avoid taxes because they have ample cash tax savings. 
Consequently, firms’ optimal level of tax avoidance should decrease as state tax rates fall. Our 
sixth hypothesis is as follows: 
H6: Other governments bear the the incidence of the corporate income tax. 
If the firm is unable to pass on tax costs to the other stakeholders, then the incidence of 
the tax will fall on the firm’s current shareholders. Tax incidence falls on shareholders if they 
suffer from lower after-tax returns following a tax rate increase. Prior literature that shareholders 
bear the full incidence of the corporate income tax (e.g. Harberger 1962; Mankiw 2006; Serrato 
and Zidar 2016). However, our study benefits from a quasi-experimental setting and a larger 
dataset than prior studies. Therefore, we re-analyze whether shareholders bear incidence. As 
such, our seventh and final hypothesis is as follows.   
H7: Current shareholders bear the incidence of the corporate income tax. 
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In addition, we make cross-sectional hypotheses on incidence for each stakeholder in 
section 5. Our cross-sectional hypotheses are intended to further evaluate our theory of 
incidence.  
3. EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of firm-year observations for publicly-traded firms with data on 
Compustat. In our main tests, our sample spans 1989 to 2012 (due to the state tax change data 
provided in Heider and Ljungqvist 2015). We remove financial services firms and utilities 
because their operating decisions are restricted by regulators. We remove firms headquartered 
outside the United States or in Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. We remove 
observations with missing total assets, negative book value of equity or with missing head 
quarter states. Finally, we drop all observations with missing values for our dependent variables. 
We collect headquarter data from Bill Mcdonald’s website (available at 
https://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/). We collect state-level economic data from the St. Louis 
Federal Reserve’s Economic Data (FRED) database. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles.  
In implementing our difference-in-differences regressions, we rely on the state tax rate 
increases and decreases identified in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) (see Appendix A and B in 
Heider and Ljunqvist 2015). We use 43 state corporate income tax rate increases across 24 states 
and 78 state corporate income tax cuts across 27 states. Our first treatment event occurs in 1989 
and our last occurs in 2011. On average, state tax rate increases raise rates by 93 basis points and 
state tax decreases lower rates by 55 basis points on average (both numbers are consistent with 
Heider and Ljungqvist 2015).  
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3.2. Incidence Measures 
 We rely on income statement line items to detect incidence on various stakeholders. First, 
revenues represent the welfare of consumers/customers. If consumers bear incidence following a 
state tax rate increase, prices should increase and output should fall. Revenues roughly represent 
the price times the quantity sold. Therefore, revenues represent the welfare of consumers. 
However, if prices rise and output falls following a tax rate increase, we cannot predict whether 
revenues will increase or decrease. If the magnitude of a price rise is larger than the magnitude 
of a quantity decrease, revenues will increase. Contrastingly, if the magnitude of a price rise is 
smaller than the magnitude of a quantity decrease, revenues will decrease. In both cases, 
consumers suffer a loss of welfare. A symmetric analysis applies to revenues following a state 
tax decrease. In both cases, the change in revenues depends on the relative price elasticities. 
Therefore, we predict that revenues differ significantly from zero following a state tax rate 
increase and decrease. In other words, we do not make a directional prediction because revenues 
can increase or decrease following state tax changes if consumers bear incidence. 
 Second, cost of goods sold represents the welfare on suppliers. Cost of goods sold is 
loosely the expense firms pay for inventory and related expenses. If firms demand less inventory 
from their suppliers, the price of that inventory should also fall. Therefore, cost of goods sold 
expense should decrease if suppliers bear incidence. Third, we use SG&A expense to represent 
employee welfare. SG&A expense includes many operating expenses, wages are likely a large 
portion of SG&A. Moreover, prior studies use SG&A to capture employee wages (Babenko and 
Tserlukevich 2009; Bova, Kolev, Thomas and Zhang 2015). We use non-state taxes to represent 
incidence on non-state governments, including the federal government, foreign governments and 
local governments. If non-state governments bear incidence, we expect firms to avoid more non-
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state taxes and firms’ non-state tax expense to decrease. Finally, we use net income to represent 
shareholder welfare because net income represents after-tax returns available for distribution to 
shareholders.  
3.3. Methodology 
3.3.1. Equity financing effects 
 Our first test examines the effect of state tax changes on equity financing. We implement 
difference-in-differences regressions to test whether tax rate increases and decreases affect the 
amount of firms’ equity financing. We estimate the following regression: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (1) 
 Equity Financing is defined in two ways. First, we use net equity issuances following 
Chang et al. (2006). Net equity issuances are the proceeds from the sale of common stock minus 
the amount of share repurchases. Second, we use gross equity financing. Gross equity issuances 
are the proceeds from sale of common stock and ignores any share repurchases. Increase takes a 
value of 1 if firm i experienced a corporate income tax rate increase in its headquarter state in 
year t or prior to year t.17,18 Decrease is coded to 1 if the state that firm i is headquartered in 
decreased corporate income taxes in year t or a prior year. We include both Increases and 
Decreases in our regressions following the approach in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015). By doing 
so, we control for the effects of a tax decrease (increase) when examining the effects of a tax rate 
increase (decrease) on equity financing. 𝛽𝛽1 represents the effect of a state tax rate increase on 
equity financing relative to equity financing at firms that do not experience state tax rate 
increases and relative to equity financing at firms that experience a state tax rate increase later in 
                                                          
17 Following Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), we do not limit our pre- and post-periods.  
18 We examine only the first corporate income tax rate increase and decrease in a state. By construction, 
Tax rate increase (Tax Decrease) takes a value of 1 for any subsequent state tax rate increase that occurs 
during our sample because Tax rate increase is coded to 1 following the first state tax rate increase 
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the sample period (i.e. 𝛽𝛽1 represents the difference-in-differences estimate of a state tax rate 
increase on equity financing, as noted in Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). We expect 𝛽𝛽1to be 
negative and significant, consistent with corporate income tax rate increases decreasing equity 
issuances. Similarly, 𝛽𝛽2 is the difference-in-differences estimate of a state tax decrease on equity 
issuances. We expect 𝛽𝛽2 to be positive and significant, consistent with firms issuing more equity 
financing after a corporate income tax decrease. 
Controls is a vector of fixed effects and firm-level controls that affect equity financing 
decisions. We control for state, year and firm fixed effects to remove any invariant effects that 
can confound our results. We control for firms’ book-to-market (Book-to-market) ratio because 
firms issue more equity when their shares are overvalued (Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary 2009). 
We control for common dividends (ComDiv) because firms with more shares will issue more 
total dividends. We control for capital expenditures (CapEx) because firms often issue equity to 
fund capital expenditures. We control for SG&A (SG&A) because growth firms can have higher 
SG&A expenses and also issue more equity. We control for tax avoidance (TaxAvoidance) 
because firms issue more as they avoid taxes (Lee, Shevlin and Venkat 2018). We control for 
total debt (TotalDebt) because firms with high leverage may prefer equity to debt (Chang et al. 
2009). We control for size (ln(Assets)) because larger firms issue more equity (Chang et al. 
2009). We control for intangibles (Intangibles) because firms issue more equity to finance 
intangible development (Chang et al. 2009; Goh, Lee, Lim and Shevlin 2016). Finally, we 
control for net operating losses (NOL) because the marginal benefits of debt decline as firms 
have more non-debt tax shields, such as NOL’s (Goh et al. 2016). Thus, they should prefer to 
issue equity. We also control for two state-level economic variables. First, we control for the 
state’s economic growth rate (GSP Growth) because growth rates can induce state legislatures to 
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change corporate income taxes and can also affect equity financing decisions. Second, we 
control for the state’s unemployment rate (Unemployment) because state legislatures often 
change taxes in response to unemployment (Ljungqvist et al. 2017). Furthermore, unemployment 
can affect firms’ decision to issue equity financing because high unemployment suggests that 
economic conditions are poor thus will deter firms from issuing equity financing to fund 
investment. In all regressions, we cluster standard errors by firm and year to preclude time-series 
or cross-sectional correlation from affecting our inferences.  
3.3.2. Investment effects 
 In our second test, we examine whether state corporate income tax changes affect 
investment. We implement difference-in-differences regressions using state corporate income tax 
changes as exogenous shocks to corporate income taxes. Our specification is as follows: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (2) 
 We measure Investment in two ways. Both measures are consistent with prior studies 
(e.g. Hanlon, Lester and Verdi 2015). First, we use capital expenditures scaled by lagged total 
assets (CapEx). Capital expenditures are a common form of investment. Thus, we expect firms to 
alter capital expenditures following corporate income tax changes. Second, we use research and 
development expenses scaled by lagged total assets (R&D). R&D is another important form of 
investment. Thus, we expect R&D to change as corporate income taxes change. Specifically, we 
expect 𝛽𝛽1 to be negative and significant because we hypothesize that tax rate increases reduce 
investment. We expect 𝛽𝛽2 to be positive and significant becaue we hypothesize that tax decreases 
reduce investment. Increase, Decrease and Controls are defined in the same way they were 
defined in equation (1).  
3.3.4. Incidence analyses 
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We employ a difference-in-differences methodology to test for incidence. Increase and 
Decrease are defined as before. We estimate whether state statutory corporate income tax rate 
increases and decreases are associated with other income statement accounts:  
𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (4) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶&𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (5) 
𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (6) 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (7) 
  Revenue is defined as sales scaled by lagged total assets. COGS is defined as cost of 
goods sold scaled by lagged total assets. SG&A is defined as firms’ sales, general and 
administrative expenses scaled by lagged total assets. Non-state Taxes is defined as total tax 
expense reduced by state tax expense scaled by lagged total assets. Net income is defined as net 
income scaled by lagged total assets.  
  If β1 is negative in equation (3), our results would be consistent with state tax rate 
increases decreasing revenues. We would interpret this result as suggesting that consumers bear 
the incidence of the state tax rate increase because the average price of the sold good rises by less 
than the decrease in quantity sold. If β1 is positive, we would still interpret the result as 
consistent with consumers bearing incidence because the average price of sold goods rises by 
more than the decrease in quantity sold. Therefore, we conduct two-sided t-tests on β1 to reflect 
our non-directional alternative hypothesis. In all other regressions, we perform one-sided t-tests 
because we proffer directional hypotheses. In equations (4) and (5), we expect a negative and 
significant β1 because we hypothesize that a tax rate increase results in fewer supply purchases, 
fewer employees hired and falling prices for supplies and labor overall. In equation (6), we 
 
 
22 
expect a negative β1 because firms should pay less nonstate taxes as their state tax bills rise. 
Similarly, we expect β1 in equation (7) to be negative because a state tax rate increase should 
result in falling profits for shareholders.  
 In these regressions, Controls comprises 1) firm-specific control variables, 2) year fixed 
effects, 3) firm fixed effects and 3) state fixed effects. Our set of fixed effects are intended to 
control for any invariant year-, firm- or state-specific effects that might explain our results. We 
use a parsimonious set of firm-specific controls to avoid confounding our results. Our theory is 
broad: we suggest that tax rate increases result in higher cost of equity, lower equity issuances, 
lower investment and, ultimately, incidence on various stakeholders. Therefore, common control 
variables can lead to overcontrol issues(see Swanquist and Whited 2018 for a discussion of 
appropriate controls). Still, we incorporate firm-level controls to demonstrate that our results are 
robust and for consistency with prior studies in accounting. We specifically control for firms’ 
leverage, foreign income, property, plant equipment and size. Each variable is lagged by a year 
to mitigate the possibility that they confound our results. We also control for two state-level 
economic variables. First, we control for the state’s economic growth rate (GSP Growth) because 
growth rates can induce state legislatures to change corporate income taxes and can affect sales 
and expenses. Second, we control for the state’s unemployment rate (Unemployment) because 
state legislatures may change taxes in response to unemployment. Furthermore, unemployment 
can affect firms’ revenues and expenses.  
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 In Table 1, we report descriptive statistics from our sample. Equity Issuances and Net 
Equity Issuances have mean values of .07 and .057, respectively. These values suggest firms 
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issue equity between 5.7% and 7% of lagged total assets across all firm years. Average sales 
amount to 1.359 times lagged assets. Average cost of goods sold amounts to 89% of lagged 
assets while average SG&A amounts to 37% of lagged total assets. Non-state taxes take an 
average value of .020 in our sample, suggesting that the average firm pays 2% of its lagged 
assets in non-state taxes in an average year. Average firm-year after-tax earnings are negative at -
2.6% of lagged total assets.  
 Increase takes a mean value of .309, implying that 30.9% of firm-year observations 
experience a state corporate income tax rate increase in the current or a prior year. Similarly, 
Decrease takes a mean value of .422 implying that 42.2% of firm-year observations experience a 
state corporate income tax decrease in the current or a prior year. We are unable to compare our 
state tax rate increase and decrease summary statistics to Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) because 
they do not report summary statistics on their state tax change variables.  
 In Table 2, we report Spearman (Pearson) correlations above (below) the diagonal among 
our incidence variables, our difference-in-difference variables and our controls. We find that 
Increase is negatively and significantly correlated with contemporaneous Sales, COGS and 
SG&A. These preliminary results are consistent with state tax rate increases resulting in 
incidence on consumers, suppliers and workers. Increase is uncorrelated with Non-state Taxes 
and is positively correlated with Earnings, suggesting that tax rate increases do not affect non-
state taxes and that tax rate increases are associated with higher earnings. We also find that 
Decrease is negatively and significantly correlated with contemporaneous Sales, COGS, SG&A, 
Non-state Taxes and Net Income suggesting negative associations between tax cuts and all of our 
income statement line items. These univariate results are likely infected by omitted variable bias 
and are unlikely to represent causal relationships.  
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4.2. Equity financing effects 
 In Table 3, we report the result of testing our first hypothesis: We predict that tax rate 
increases (decreases) reduce (increase) equity financing. In column (1), we find that the 
difference-in-differences estimate on Increase is negative and significant at the 1% level when 
using net equity issuances as our dependent variable. In economic terms, our estimate implies 
that corporate income tax rate increases reduce equity issuances by 1.5% of total assets relative 
to equity issuances at firms that never experience corporate income tax rate increases and relative 
to equity issuances at firms that have not yet experienced a corporate income tax rate increase. 
We also find evidence consistent with state tax decreases having no effect on net equity 
issuances, ceteris paribus. Specifically, we find that the coefficient on Decrease is insignificant 
at conventional levels. Thus, the effect of corporate income taxes on net equity issuances appears 
to be asymmetric.  
In column (2), we find that the coefficient on Increase is negative and significant at the 
5% level when using gross equity issuances as our dependent variable. Our results suggest that 
firms reduce equity issuances by .7% of total assets following state tax rate increases compared 
to equity issuances prior to the state tax rate increase and compared to equity issuances by firms 
in state that have not raised their corporate income tax. On the other hand, the coefficient on 
Decrease is insignificant at conventional levels, as was the case in column (1). Similar to our 
results in column (1), our results are consistent with corporate income taxes having an 
asymmetric effect on equity issuances: while tax rate increases reduce equity financing, tax 
decreases have no effect.   
 Our controls are mostly consistent with predictions. We find that the coefficient on book-
to-market is negative and significant in columns (1) and (2), suggesting that firms issue more 
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equity when market value of equity is high relative to book value of equity. We find that the 
coefficient on ComDiv is positive and significant, suggesting that firms with more equity 
issuances have to pay more in dividends. We find that the coefficient on CapEx is positive and 
significant in both columns, suggesting that firms issue more financing as they purchase more 
capital assets. The coefficient on SG&A is positive and significant in both columns, consistent 
with firms issuing more equity as they increase their SG&A. We find that leverage (Leverage) is 
negatively and significantly associated with equity issuances in both columns, suggesting that 
firms with more leverage issue less equity. We find that the coefficient on Intangibles is 
positively and significantly associated with equity issuances, consistent with firms issuing more 
equity as they acquire more intangibles. We find that the coefficient on PPE(Net) is positive and 
significant, consistent with firms issuing more equity when they report large amounts of 
property, plan and equipment. We find that the coefficient on Foreign Income is negative and 
significant, implying that firms with large levels of foreign income use equity financing less. We 
also find that state economic growth is associated with firms issuing more equity, consistent with 
firms financing projects via equity when investment in the state is likely to be profitable due to 
high economic growth.  
These results are novel to the incidence literature in two ways. First, we are the first to 
directly examine whether tax changes affect equity financing. Incidence theory generally 
assumes that tax changes affect the supply of capital (Harberger 1962; Gravelle 2013). We are 
the first to test this explicitly. Second, we offer evidence that tax effects on the supply of capital 
are asymmetric: tax decreases do not affect equity financing while increases actually reduce 
equity financing.  
4.3. Investment effects 
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 In Table 4, we report the results of testing our second hypothesis. Specifically, we report 
the results of testing whether tax decreases (increases) increase (decrease) investment. In column 
(1), we report the results of testing whether corporate income tax rate increases (Increase) and 
decreases (Decreases) affect capital expenditures (CapEx). We find that the coefficient on 
Increase is negative and significant at the 5% level while the coefficient on Decrease is 
insignificant at conventional levels. In economic terms, our estimate of the effect of state tax rate 
increases on CapEx implies that state tax rate increases reduce capital expenditures by .4% of 
total assets relative to prior to the tax rate increase and relative to firms that never experience a 
tax rate increase. We find no association between state tax decreases and capital expenditures. 
Thus, our capital expenditure results are asymmetric. 
 In column (2), we report difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Increase and 
Decrease on R&D. The coefficient on Increase is negative and significant at the 1% level. This 
result is consistent with firms decreasing their research and development expenditures following 
state tax rate increases. However, we find that the coefficient on Decrease remains insignificant 
at conventional levels. Thus, the effects of taxes on investment are asymmetric. Overall, our 
results are consistent with corporate income tax rate increases reducing investment, as predicted 
by corporate income tax incidence theory. However, we find that tax decreases have no effect on 
investment.  
4.4. State tax rate increases and decreases 
 In Table 5, we report the results of examining the incidence of corporate income tax rate 
increases. We reports estimates from regressions of Sales, COGS, SG&A, Non-state Taxes and 
Earnings (respectively) on Increase and Decrease using a difference-in-differences design. In 
column (1) of Panel A, we find that Sales are negatively and significantly associated with 
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Increase at the 1% level. In other words, tax rate increases are associated with reductions in 
sales. This result is consistent with tax rate increases resulting in 1) a decrease market-clearing 
quantity and a decrease in market-clearing sales price, 2) an increase in sales price but a larger 
decrease in quantity or 3) an increase in quantity but a larger decrease in sales price. In cases 1) 
or 2), incidence is borne in part by consumers. In case 3, consumers receive benefits from a tax 
rate increase. We posit that the probability of cases 1) and 2) is higher than the probability of 3) 
because 1) and 2) are consistent with accepted economic theories of incidence while 3) is 
difficult to explain. Therefore, we interpret our results as consistent with consumers bearing 
some corporate income tax incidence. We also find that the coefficient on Decrease is 
insignificant. This result is consistent with consumers receiving none of the benefits of tax 
decreases (e.g. in the form of increased output and/or lower prices). 
 In column (2), we find that COGS is negatively and significantly related to state tax rate 
increases at the 5% level. Contrastingly, we find that COGS is not significantly associated with 
tax decreases. Our results are consistent with a state tax rate increase resulting in lower prices 
and/or lower quantities supplied to firms but with a state tax decrease having no effect on 
suppliers. As such, we interpret our results as consistent with suppliers bearing the burden of 
corporate income tax rate increases but receiving none of the benefits of a corporate income tax 
decreases. 
 In column (3), we find that SG&A is negatively related to state tax rate increases. The 
coefficient on Increase is significant at the 1% level. Our result is consistent with employees 
bearing a portion of the corporate income tax. Contrastingly, we find that SG&A is unassociated 
with state tax decreases. We interpret our results as consistent with employees bearing some of 
 
 
28 
the costs of corporate income tax rate increases, but receiving little of the benefits of a corporate 
income tax decrease.  
 In column (4), we examine the relation between non-state taxes and state tax rate 
increases and decreases. We find that Increase is negatively and significantly related to non-state 
taxes. This result is consistent with firms avoiding more non-state taxes when facing a corporate 
income tax rate increase. Thus, our results are consistent with non-state governments, including 
the federal government, bearing the burden of a state tax rate increase. Contrastingly, we find 
that non-state taxes are unassociated with state tax decreases. Specifically, the coefficient on 
Decrease is insignificant at conventional levels. We infer that firms do not alter their non-state 
tax avoidance when benefitting from a state tax cut.  
 Our final result is consistent with shareholders bearing little incidence. We find that 
earnings are insignificantly related to either state tax rate increases or decrease. Specifically, the 
coefficients on both Increase and Decrease are insignificant when earnings is our dependent 
variable. We interpret this result as suggesting that shareholders are able to pass on tax rate 
increases but receive none of the benefits of tax decreases. Moreover, our result is consistent 
with the results pertaining to Increase in columns (1) through (3): while revenues fall following 
state tax rate increases, COGS and SG&A do as well. Therefore, earnings are not affected by the 
state tax rate increase.    
 Overall, our results are consistent with various stakeholders bearing the incidence of 
corporate income tax rate increases. Specifically, we infer that consumers, suppliers and labor all 
bear some portion of the corporate income tax. Contrary to Harberger (1962), we find that 
shareholders bear none of the incidence, likely because consumers, suppliers and labor are not 
perfectly mobile and cannot perfectly substitute away from taxed companies. Interestingly, our 
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results are consistent with incidence asymmetry. That is, our results are consistent with 
consumers, suppliers, employees and shareholders benefitting little from state tax decreases but 
suffering from tax rate increases. 
5. CROSS-SECTIONAL TESTS 
We perform one cross-sectional test for each of our dependent variables. We identify 
variables that we expect to moderate or enhance incidence on each, respective stakeholder. We 
then perform the same difference-in-differences regressions as before but incorporate 
interactions between Increase and a variable that captures cross-sectional variation in incidence 
on particular stakeholders (XsecVar). Each variable is defined below and in Appendix A. We 
also interact XsecVar with Decrease but do not offer hypothesis on tax rate decreases because we 
found insignificant decrease results in our main tests. Our results are reported in Table 6. 
5.1 Sales – Price elasticity of demand 
First, we hypothesize that firms in more elastic product markets experience a greater 
decrease in revenues than firms in inelastic markets following a tax rate increase. When firms 
reduce output in elastic markets due to tax rate increases, output will fall by more than prices 
rise. Contrastingly, output will fall less than prices rise when firms cut output in inelastic 
markets. Consequently, overall revenues should fall more following tax rate increases when 
markets are elastic compared to when markets are inelastic. 
To measure elasticity, we split our sample based on industry by estimated elasticity. We 
use estimates of demand elasticities from Anderson, McLellan, Overton and Wolfram (1997). 
Anderson et al. do not provide comprehensive estimates of elasticities across industries. Thus, 
we rely on intuition to code industries as elastic and inelastic based on their estimates. We code 
agriculture/mining, transportation and manufacturing as elastic because Anderson et al. suggest 
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that the markets for fresh tomatoes, air transportation and automobile parts are highly elastic. We 
code retail trade and services as inelastic because Anderson et al. suggest salt, matches and 
physician and legal services are all inelastic.19 We expect that the coefficient on the interaction 
between Increase and our elasticity variable is negative. 
We report results of this test in column (1) of Table 6. We find that the coefficient on the 
interaction between Increase and elasticity (as represented by XsecVar) is negative and 
significant at the 5% level. We also find that the coefficient on the interaction between Decrease 
and profit margins is positive and significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with 
firms in elastic product markets generating lower revenues following tax rate increases compared 
to firms in inelastic markets.  
5.2 Suppliers – Market power  
Next, we hypothesize that market power increases incidence on suppliers. We expect that 
firms in imperfect competition will decrease their output towards monopolistic levels following 
tax rate increases (Auerbach 2006). Thus, their demand for supplies and inventory will fall tend 
towards monopsonistic (single-buyer) levels following tax rate increases. Consequently, market-
clearing price and quantity will fall incrementally more when firms are imperfectly competing 
for supplies and inventory. 
We use profit margins to represent market power in supply markets (Kubick, Lynch, 
Mayberry and Omer 2014). Firms with high markups likely have high market power in supply 
markets and are thus able to reduce their inventory costs. We expect that the coefficient on the 
interaction between profit margins and Increase is negative. 
                                                          
19 We recognize that mislabeling industry elasticities might introduce noise into our measure. However, 
comprehensive, industry-wide elasticity estimates are not readily available. 
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We report results of this test in column (2) of Table 6. We find that the coefficient on the 
interaction between Increase and profit margins (XsecVar) is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. We find that the coefficient on the interaction between Decrease and profit margins is 
insignificant. These results are consistent with tax rate increases reducing the demand of supplies 
and inventory incrementally more when competition is imperfect compared to when markets are 
competitive. However, we find that tax decreases do not benefit suppliers more when 
competition is imperfect compared to when markets are more competitive. 
5.3 Labor - Union membership 
Third, we hypothesize that union membership increases tax incidence on labor based on 
the findings of Felix and Hines (2009). Felix and Hines argue that union wages are generally 
higher than non-union wages because union wages represent unions bargaining successfully for 
the economic rents of the firm. When taxes rise, union workers suffer more than non-unionized 
workers because they must forego economic rents in addition to bearing incidence from reduced 
labor demand. Relying on this argument, Felix and Hines (2009) find that the difference between 
union wages and non-union wages is nearly equal in high-tax states but dramatically that union 
workers are paid substantially higher than non-union workers in low-tax states.20  
We measure union membership using union density. This measure captures the 
percentage of total workers that are unionized in a given state in a particular year. We expect the 
coefficient on the interaction between Increase and union membership density to be negative. 
Results are reported in column (3) of Table 6. We find that the coefficient on the 
interaction between Increase and union membership density is negative and significant at the 5% 
                                                          
20 Unionized labor may also bear less incidence. Union contracts may prevent firms from shifting taxes to unionized 
workers and unions may credibly threaten to protest decreases in wages or layoffs.  
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level. Contrastingly, the coefficient on the interaction between Decrease and union membership 
is insignificant. Our results are consistent with union members bearing more of the costs of tax 
rate increases but not receiving the benefits of tax decreases. 
5.4 Non-state governments - Tax risk 
Fourth, we hypothesize that firms willing to take more tax risk will increase tax 
avoidance following tax rate increases compared to firms unwilling to take tax risk. That is, we 
expect tax rate increases to affect marginal tax avoidance decisions by reducing expected after-
tax profits. At the margin, firms will be more willing to take tax risks to avoid taxes to recoup 
lost profits from the state tax rate increase. We expect that firms willing to take the most tax risk 
will avoid the most non-state taxes following a tax increase.  
We measure risky tax avoidance using the volatility of GAAP effective tax rates. We 
expect that firms engaging in risky tax avoidance will experience more volatile effective tax rates 
compared to firms engaging in less risky tax avoidance (Demere, Lisowsky, Li and Snyder 2016 
suggest that GAAP ETR volatility is partially driven by tax risk). We expect that the coefficient 
on the interaction between the volatility of GAAP ETR and Increase is negative. 
Our results are reported in column (4) of Table 6. We find that the coefficient on the 
interaction between Increase and GAAP ETR volatility is negative and significant at the 10% 
level. The coefficient on the interaction between Decrease and GAAP ETR volatility is positive 
and significant at the 5% level. Overall, our results are consistent with the firms willing to 
engage in the most risky tax avoidance increasing non-state tax avoidance the most following tax 
rate increases. Similarly, we find that firms taking the highest tax risk increasing non-state tax 
avoidance the most following a tax rate cut. 
5.5 Shareholders - Financial constraints 
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In our last cross-sectional test, we analyze whether financial constraints enhance 
corporate income tax incidence on shareholders. We hypothesize that shareholders in financially 
constrained firms bear less of the costs of corporate income tax rate increases because 
financially-constrained firms are less reliant on external financing compared to other firms. Thus, 
corporate tax changes should not alter the investment decisions of financially-constrained firms, 
resulting in less of a decrease in earnings compared to earnings decreases at unconstrained firms.  
We measure financial constraints using Altman’s Z score (Altman 1968). We expect that 
the coefficient on the interaction between Altman’s Z score and Increase is negative. Such 
results would be consistent with shareholders at unconstrained firms reciving more of the costs 
of a tax rate increase. 
We report results in column (5) of Table 6. We find that the coefficient on the interaction 
between Increase and Altman Z score is negative and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient 
on the interaction between Decrease and Altman Z score is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. Our results are consistent with financially unconstrained firms passing on more of the costs 
(benefits) of a tax rate increase (decrease) to shareholders compared to financially constrained 
firms. 
6. ADDITIONAL TEST: Large tax rate increases and decreases  
 We also test whether large tax decreases result in incidence. We note that tax decreases 
seem to have no effect on income statement line items. We suspect that low power explains these 
null results. Specifically, we note that many of the state tax decreases we use are small in 
magnitude. Many of our corporate income tax cuts reduce corporate taxes by less than .25%. 
Consequently, state tax cuts might not have any effect or might have only small effects on firm 
operations. Contrastingly, state tax rate increases are generally large. To examine whether tax cut 
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sizes explain our null results, we repeat our analysis but include only large tax decreases (Big 
Decrease) with all state tax rate increases. Big Decrease takes a value of 1 if firm i is 
headquarted in a state that decrease corporate taxes by 1% or more in year t or in any prior year 
and 0 otherwise. Thus, Big Decrease includes only relatively large tax decreases.  Beyond this 
difference, our specifications are identical to the ones used above. Our coefficient predictions are 
also identifical. 
 We report our results in Table 7. Our results are nearly identical to our prior results, 
except we now find that Decrease is positively associated with SG&A. Specifically, we find that 
Big Decrease has no effect on sales, COGS, non-state taxes or ROA. However, we find that the 
coefficient on Decrease is positive and significant at the 5% level in column (3). Our results are 
consistent with firms using tax savings to pay employees and suppliers more or to hire more 
workers. Thus, our results suggest that employees suffer the costs of tax rate increases, but also 
benefit from tax decreases. Overall, we interpret these results as suggesting that only labor bears 
symmetric incidence. Other stakeholders seem to only suffer when taxes increase while not 
benefitting when taxes decrease. 
7. CONCLUSION 
 In this study, we attempt to provide robust evidence on corporate income tax incidence. 
We hypothesize that consumers, suppliers, employees, non-state governments and shareholders 
all bear incidence because each stakeholder transacts with firms. We predict that state tax rate 
increases lead to firms to provide less output to consumers, demand less inputs from suppliers, 
demand less labor from employees, avoid more non-state taxes and provide less returns to 
shareholders. Symmetrically, we expect tax rate decreases lead to higher output, higher demand 
from suppliers and labors, less non-state tax avoidance and higher earnings. 
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 We begin by implementing difference-in-differences regressions to test whether state 
taxes are associated with equity issuances. Using a sample of state corporate income tax rate 
increases and decreases, we document that state tax rate increases reduce equity issuances but 
that state tax decreases have no effect. Thus, the supply of capital to firms seems asymmetric 
between tax rate increases and decreases. This result suggests that prior models of corporate 
income tax incidence (e.g. Harberger 1962) are only partially correct. 
 Next, we test whether state tax changes affect investment. Incidence theory generally 
assumes that corporate income tax changes alter investment because it affects cost of capital and 
financing decisions. We test whether corporate tax rate changes affect investment by regressing 
investment meausures on our increase and decrease variables in a difference-in-differences 
specification. We find that state corporate income tax rate increases reduce investment but that 
corporate income tax decreases have no effect on incidence. Thus, our results suggest that 
corporate income taxes and investment are asymmetrically related.  
 Next, we implement difference-in-differences regressions to test for stakeholder 
incidence. We use revenues, COGS, SG&A, non-state taxes and net income as dependent 
variables to measure the welfare of consumers, suppliers, employees, non-state governments and 
shareholders, respectively. We find that sales, COGS, SG&A and non-state taxes are negatively 
associated with state tax rate increases. We infer that consumers, suppliers, employees and non-
state governments bear some incidence.  
 Additionally, we incorporate state tax decreases in our same difference-in-differences 
regressions to determine whether incidence is asymmetric. We find that corporate income state 
tax decreases are not associated with any income statement line item. Thus, we conclude that 
none of our identified stakeholders receive the benefits of a state tax cut.  
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 We perform one cross-sectional test for each dependent variable. First, we find that sales 
fall (rise) more when the firm facing a tax rate increase (decrease) is in an elastic product market 
compared to when the firm is in an inelastic product market. Second, we find that COGS fall 
more when the firm facing a tax rate increase has more market power compared to when it 
doesn’t. We find no effects for tax decreases. Third, we find that union membership increases the 
negative effect of tax rate increases on SG&A, consistent with unionized labor bearing more 
incidence than non-unionized labor. We find no effects for decreases. We find that tax risk 
increases the negative effect of tax rate increases on non-state taxes, consistent with firms willing 
to take more tax risk avoiding more non-state taxes than firms unwilling to take tax risk. 
Symmetrically, we find that tax risk decreases the positive effect of tax rate increases on non-
state taxes. Finally, we find that financially unconstrained firms pass on more of the costs 
(benefits) of a tax rate increase (decrease) to shareholders relative to constrained firms, 
consistent with tax changes affecting shareholders of constrained firms less than shareholders of 
unconstrained firms.  
In an additional test, we examine whether tax cuts have little effect on various 
stakeholders because they are too small. We omit tax decreases of less than 1% and perform the 
same tests as before. We find that large tax decreases are associated with increases in SG&A but 
are unassociated with other income statement items. Our results are consistent with tax decreases 
benefitting workers and employees.  
 Our study makes several contributions. First, we improve on identification in prior 
incidence studies by using several difference-in-differences specifications to examine incidence. 
Second, we test the assumptions that corporate income taxes are negatively associated with 
equity issuances and investment, as is consistent with the assumption in corporate income tax 
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incidence models that corporate income taxes reduce the supply of capital to firms (Auerbach 
2006). Third, we demonstrate that incidence itself is asymmetric: while consumers, suppliers and 
non-state governments all suffer from corporate income tax rate increases, these same 
stakeholders do not benefit from tax decreases. Our study should prove useful to policymakers 
and those interested in predicting the consequences of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables  
Sales Sales (net) (SALES) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
COGS Cost of goods sold (COGS) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
SG&A Sales, general and administrative expense (XSGA) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
Non-state Taxes Total income tax expense (TXT) minus state income tax expense (TXS) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
Net Income Net income (NI) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
Equity Issuances Sale of common stock and preferred stock (SSTK) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
Net Equity Issuances 
Sale of common stock and preferred stock (SSTK) minus purchase 
of common stock and preferred stock (PRSTKC) scaled by 
beginning total assets (AT) 
Capex Capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
R&D Expense Research and development expense (XRD) in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1. We set missing values to zero 
Independent Variables  
Increase 
Takes a value of 1 if the given firm is headquartered in a state that 
experienced a state corporate income tax rate increase in the current 
year or a prior year in the sample 
Decrease 
Takes a value of 1 if the given firm is headquartered in a state that 
experienced a state corporate income tax decrease in the current 
year or a prior year in the sample 
Controls  
ln(Assets) The natural logarithm of assets (AT) 
Book-to-Market Natural log of book-to-market at fiscal year-end 
Comdiv Common stock dividends (DVC) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
CETR3 
3-year cumulative cash effective tax rate calculated as the 3-year 
sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD) scaled by the 3-year sum of pre-tax 
income (PI) less special items (SPI) and multiplied by -1. 
Foreign Income Foreign pre-tax income (PIFO) scaled by beginning total assets (AT). 
Intangibles Intangibles (INTAN) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
Leverage Long term debt (DLTT) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
NOL Equals 1 if the firm reports a positive NOL carryforward (TLCF) and 0 itherwise 
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PPE(Net) Net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) scaled by beginning total assets (AT) 
TA 
Total accruals, Income before extraorindary items (IB) minus cash 
flows from operating activities (OANCF) scaled by beginning total 
assets (AT) 
GSP Growth  Economic growth rate for each state extracted from the FRED Economic Data website 
Unemployment  Unemployment rate for each state extracted from the FRED Economic Data website 
Cross-sectional variables 
Elasticity 
Coded to 1 if firm i’s SIC2 industry is agriculture/mining, 
transportation or manufacturing and 0 if firm i’s SIC2 industry is 
retail or services. 
IndAdjPM 
Industry adjusted profit margin is defined as a firm’s profit margin 
minus the mean profit margin by industry (SIC2) in a given fiscal 
year. Profit margin is calculated as pretax income (PI – SPI) 
divided by sales (SALE) 
UnionMembership 
An indicator that take a value of 1 if a firm faces union membership 
above the median union membership by industry (SIC2) in a given 
calendar year. Union membership is defined as percentage of 
nonagricultural wage and salary employees who are union members 
in a state in a given year. we obtain the data from 
http://www.unionstat.com. 
TaxRisk Standard deviation of GAAP effective tax rates (TXT/(PI-SPI)) over the past five years (t-4 to t) 
FinConst 
We calculate Altman-Z Score as follows: 
Altman-Z = {3.3*PI + 1*SALE +1.4*RE + (ACT – LCT)}/lagAT 
Where PI is pre-tax income, SALE is sales, RE is retained earnings, 
ACT is current assets, LCT is current liabilities, and lagAT is lagged 
total assets (at). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES N Mean Median SD Min 25th 75th Max 
Sales t 89693 1.373 1.175 1.003 0.000 0.697 1.770 5.483 
COGS t 89693 0.905 0.697 0.832 0.000 0.330 1.193 4.556 
SG&A t 89693 0.387 0.306 0.326 0.016 0.155 0.519 1.805 
Non-state Taxes t 89693 0.020 0.011 0.038 -0.092 0.000 0.037 0.161 
Net Income t 89693 -0.025 0.031 0.236 -1.252 -0.052 0.085 0.398 
Increase 89693 0.309 0.000 0.462 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Decrease 89693 0.423 0.000 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ln(Assets) t-1 89693 4.864 4.800 2.200 0.065 3.276 6.385 10.205 
Leverage t-1 89627 0.250 0.187 0.277 0.000 0.022 0.373 1.568 
PPE(Net) t-1 89693 0.324 0.232 0.306 0.002 0.104 0.442 1.666 
ForeignIncome t-1 89693 0.008 0.000 0.027 -0.063 0.000 0.000 0.145 
TA t 89693 -0.068 -0.056 0.141 -0.679 -0.114 -0.006 0.357 
GSP Growth t 89693 0.027 0.026 0.027 -0.103 0.011 0.043 0.222 
Unemployment t 89693 0.060 0.057 0.019 0.022 0.047 0.069 0.139 
Net Equity Issue t 89546 0.068 0.000 0.280 -0.186 0.000 0.013 1.965 
Equity Issuances t 88149 0.083 0.004 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.021 2.001 
Capex t 88925 0.071 0.041 0.093 0.000 0.019 0.083 0.574 
R&D t 89693 0.048 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.504 
Book-to-Market t 85752 0.726 0.522 0.722 0.032 0.293 0.888 4.554 
Comdiv t 89693 0.008 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.131 
CETR3 t 52294 -0.277 -0.278 0.168 -1.000 -0.368 -0.161 0.000 
Intangibles t 80484 0.150 0.047 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.209 1.271 
NOL t 89693 0.310 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.084 6.886 
Note: Our sample period spans 1989 to 2012. All variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the 
effect of outliers. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
.
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Table 2. Pearson’s (below) and Spearman’s (above) Corrlation Matrices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Increase 1 0.34 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 -0.03 -0.08 0.07 0.00 -0.15 0.10 
(2) Decrease 0.34 1 -0.08 -0.10 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.11 -0.14 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 
(3) Sales t -0.03 -0.06 1 0.92 0.43 0.30 0.36 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.17 0.04 -0.06 
(4) COGS t -0.02 -0.07 0.94 1 0.19 0.20 0.25 -0.01 0.12 0.05 -0.02 0.16 0.03 -0.06 
(5) SG&A t -0.02 0.05 0.39 0.17 1 0.02 -0.05 -0.42 -0.30 -0.34 -0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.03 
(6) Non-state Taxes t -0.01 -0.03 0.24 0.14 0.04 1 0.69 0.24 -0.08 0.07 0.19 0.17 0.02 -0.05 
(7) Net Income t 0.02 -0.05 0.27 0.18 -0.32 0.39 1 0.23 -0.05 0.09 0.19 0.37 0.02 -0.04 
(8) ln(Assets)  t-1 0.12 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.42 0.14 0.30 1 0.24 0.20 0.34 0.00 -0.10 0.05 
(9) Leverage t-1 -0.04 -0.09 -0.03 0.02 -0.21 -0.11 0.01 0.17 1 0.38 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 
(10) PPE(Net) t-1 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.07 -0.26 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.42 1 0.01 -0.14 0.09 -0.08 
(11) ForeignIncome t-1 0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.16 0.15 0.28 -0.03 -0.02 1 0.05 -0.07 0.05 
(12) TA t-1 0.01 -0.03 0.17 0.16 -0.11 0.14 0.53 0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.04 1 0.02 -0.04 
(13) GSP growth t-1 -0.15 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.10 0.02 0.08 -0.06 0.03 1 -0.22 
(14) Unemployment t-1 0.15 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 -0.08 0.06 -0.03 -0.25 1 
Note: This table presents the Pearson’s (below) and Spearman’s (above) correlation matrices among dependent variables, Sales, COGS, SG&A, Non-state Taxes, 
Net Income and Controls. All control variables are defined in Appendix A. We bold all correlations that are statistically significant at 0.10 level or better (two-
tailed) 
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Table 3. The effect of state tax changes on firms’ equity issuance decisions 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Predicted Net Equity Issuances Equity Issuances 
Increase - -0.021*** -0.012*** 
  (-3.95) (-2.64) 
Decrease  + -0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.32) (-0.12) 
ln(Assets) + 0.005* 0.006** 
  (1.43) (2.01) 
Book-to-Market t - -0.012*** -0.014*** 
  (-3.33) (-4.34) 
Comdiv t + 0.314*** 0.296*** 
  (11.38) (10.77) 
SG&A t + 0.468*** 0.505*** 
  (2.63) (2.76) 
Earnings t -/+ 0.105*** 0.162*** 
  (4.44) (7.01) 
CETR3 t + 0.012* 0.006 
  (1.53) (0.76) 
Leverage t - -0.084*** -0.076*** 
  (-4.26) (-3.73) 
Intangibles t + 0.154*** 0.133*** 
  (8.14) (6.57) 
PPE(Net) t + 0.156*** 0.142*** 
  (8.24) (7.24) 
Foreign Income t - -0.269*** -0.165*** 
  (-5.84) (-3.38) 
NOL t + -0.005 -0.007 
  (-0.48) (-0.83) 
GSP Growth t + 0.111*** 0.057** 
  (3.78) (2.49) 
Unemployment t -/+ -0.008 0.048 
  (-0.08) (0.51) 
Observations  44,300 44,300 
Adj. R2  0.361 0.358 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes 
State FE  Yes Yes 
SE clustered by year  Yes Yes 
SE clustered by firm  Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents the results of a difference-in-difference regression using state tax rate increases as a 
plausibly exogenous treatment. In column (1), we use share issuances minus share repurchases scaled by lagged 
assets as our dependent variable. In column (2), we use share issuances scaled by lagged assets as our dependent 
variable. Our control variables are defined in Appendix A. In both specifications, we use firm, state and year-level 
fixed effects. Fixed effects are omitted for parsimony. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered 
at the firm and year level, following the suggestions in Petersen (2009).We perform one-sided t-tests on each 
coefficient. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 4. The effect of state tax changes on firms’ Investment 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Predicted Capex R&D expense 
Increase - -0.004** -0.006*** 
  (-1.92) (-3.47) 
Decrease  + 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.85) (-0.92) 
ln(Assets) + -0.003*** -0.000 
  (-2.97) (-0.29) 
Book-to-Market t - -0.009*** -0.000 
  (-6.38) (-0.18) 
Comdiv t + 0.023*** 0.077*** 
  (5.76) (17.89) 
SG&A t + -0.077*** -0.004 
  (-3.53) (-0.37) 
Earnings t -/+ 0.065*** -0.009** 
  (13.01) (-2.20) 
CETR3 t + -0.000 0.002* 
  (-0.04) (1.64) 
Leverage t - -0.014*** -0.002* 
  (-3.78) (-1.45) 
Intangibles t + -0.007** -0.000 
  (-1.98) (-0.09) 
PPE(Net) t + 0.295*** 0.003* 
  (32.55) (1.61) 
Foreign Income t - -0.026** 0.010 
  (-2.39) (0.96) 
NOL t + -0.012*** 0.002 
  (-4.08) (0.93) 
GSP Growth t + 0.022* -0.004 
  (1.38) (-0.69) 
Unemployment t -/+ -0.152*** -0.008 
  (-3.54) (-0.42) 
Observations  44,300 44,300 
Adj. R2  0.751 0.887 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes 
State FE  Yes Yes 
SE clustered by year  Yes Yes 
SE clustered by firm  Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents the results of a difference-in-difference regression using state tax rate increases as a 
plausibly exogenous treatment. In column (1), we use capital expenditure as a proxy for firms’ investment. In 
column (2), we use R&D expense as a proxy for firms’ investment. Our control variables are defined in Appendix 
A. In both specifications, we use firm, state and year-level fixed effects. Fixed effects are omitted for parsimony. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level, following the suggestions in 
Petersen (2009).We perform one-sided t-tests on each coefficient. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. State tax rate increases and decreases 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
Dependent Variable Sales COGS SG&A Non-state Taxes Net Income 
      
Increase -0.060*** -0.030** -0.021*** -0.004*** 0.001 
 (-2.85) (-1.90) (-2.74) (-3.19) (0.28) 
Decrease -0.018 -0.009 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-1.20) (-0.81) (-0.16) (-0.45) (-0.53) 
ln(Assets) t-1  -0.315*** -0.187*** -0.143*** -0.004*** 0.011*** 
 (-17.42) (-16.42) (-20.10) (-6.47) (5.12) 
Leverage t-1 -0.149*** -0.101*** -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.019*** 
 (-6.54) (-6.30) (-3.05) (-11.38) (-3.41) 
PPE(Net) t-1 0.068*** 0.008 0.024** 0.008*** -0.001 
 (3.01) (0.54) (2.24) (6.57) (-0.07) 
Foreign Income t-1 1.220*** 0.541*** 0.269*** 0.099*** 0.360*** 
 (9.91) (5.76) (6.36) (8.71) (13.91) 
TA t 0.465*** 0.221*** -0.128*** 0.021*** 0.700*** 
 (10.76) (7.34) (-5.45) (4.62) (30.18) 
GSP Growth t 0.134 0.101 -0.061* 0.013 0.014 
 (0.95) (0.89) (-1.58) (1.25) (0.47) 
Unemployment t -1.237** -1.019*** -0.327*** -0.072*** -0.093 
 (-2.43) (-2.67) (-2.54) (-3.10) (-0.98) 
      
Observations 89,693 89,693 89,693 89,693 89,693 
Adjusted R-squared 0.756 0.799 0.786 0.332 0.685 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents baseline firm-level difference-in-difference estimates using state tax rate increases as 
plausibly exogenous treatments. We use five dependent variables from firms’ income statements to measure 
incidence on various stakeholders. Sales is constructed as sales divided by lagged assets. COGS is constructed as the 
cost of goods sold divided by lagged assets. SG&A is constructed as sales, general and administrative expenses 
divided by lagged assets. Non-state Taxes is total tax expense minus federal tax expense scaled by lagged assets. Net 
Income is net income scaled by lagged assets. In each specification, we use various state-level measured at t and 
firm-level controls measured at t-1. All control variables are defined in Appendix A. We use firm fixed effects to 
remove fixed within-firm variation over time, state fixed effects to remove state-wide shocks and year fixed effects 
to remove annual, economy-wide shocks. Fixed effects are omitted for parsimony. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level, following the suggestions in Petersen (2009). One-sided 
t-tests are performed on our Increase and Decrease variables, except when Sales is the dependent variable. t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Cross-sectional tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
Dependent Variable Sales COGS SG&A Non-state Taxes Net Income 
      
Increase -0.0246 -0.025* -0.012* -0.003** 0.007 
 (0.0341) (-1.62) (-1.70) (-1.88) (1.20) 
Increase*XsecVar -0.0650** -0.001*** -0.015** -0.010* -0.003** 
 (0.0370) (-2.67) (-2.18) (-1.32) (-1.83) 
Decrease -0.0853*** -0.012 -0.004 -0.002* -0.004 
 (0.0249) (-1.12) (-0.72) (-1.48) (-1.17) 
Decrease* XsecVar 0.0783*** 0.000 0.005 0.017** 0.002*** 
 (0.0281) (1.06) (0.94) (2.41) (2.81) 
XsecVar -0.221*** 0.001*** 0.007* -0.017*** 0.003** 
 (0.0565) (3.38) (1.61) (-2.53) (1.99) 
ln(Assets) t-1  -0.353*** -0.211*** -0.143*** -0.010*** 0.006** 
 (0.0186) (-18.30) (-20.10) (-9.89) (2.31) 
Leverage t-1 -0.137*** -0.100*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.013** 
 (0.0231) (-6.54) (-3.03) (-12.14) (-2.04) 
PPE(Net) t-1 0.0702** 0.001 0.023** 0.015*** -0.007 
 (0.0289) (0.04) (2.24) (10.16) (-0.68) 
Foreign Income t-1 1.152*** 0.568*** 0.269*** 0.097*** 0.349*** 
 (0.127) (6.06) (6.35) (7.65) (10.45) 
TA t 0.499*** 0.240*** -0.128*** 0.049*** 0.686*** 
 (0.0437) (8.08) (-5.45) (12.08) (29.92) 
GSP Growth t 0.0147 0.095 -0.064* 0.015 0.017 
 (0.143) (0.83) (-1.65) (1.20) (0.56) 
Unemployment t -1.329** -1.033*** -0.300** -0.097*** -0.071 
 (0.561) (-2.63) (-2.35) (-3.89) (-0.64) 
      
Observations 73,772 87,867 89,693 67,725 86,638 
Adjusted R-squared 0.798 0.804 0.786 0.365 0.697 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents cross-sectional tests using a different cross-sectional variable for each dependent variable. 
XsecVar represents the different cross-sectional variables. First, we use elasticity in the Sales test. Second, we use 
industry-adjusted profit margins in the COGS test. Third, we use union membership in the SG&A test. Fourth, we 
use a volatility of GAAP effective tax rates over the past five in the Non-state Taxes test. We use Altman-Z scores in 
the Net Income test. All control variables are defined in Appendix A. We use firm, state and year fixed effects. Fixed 
effects are omitted for parsimony. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year 
level, following the suggestions in Petersen (2009). One-sided t-tests are performed on our interaction terms, 
Increase and Decrease, except when Sales is the dependent variable. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 7. Additional test: State tax rate increases and big decreases 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
Dependent Variable Sales COGS SG&A Non-state Taxes Net Income 
      
Increase -0.063*** -0.031** -0.021*** -0.004*** 0.001 
 (-2.93) (-2.00) (-2.74) (-3.23) (0.25) 
Big Decrease -0.008 -0.014 0.014** -0.002 0.002 
 (-0.29) (-0.69) (1.73) (-0.96) (0.39) 
ln(Assets) t-1  -0.315*** -0.187*** -0.143*** -0.004*** 0.011*** 
 (-17.47) (-16.43) (-20.18) (-6.41) (5.10) 
Leverage t-1 -0.149*** -0.101*** -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.019*** 
 (-6.54) (-6.30) (-3.02) (-11.37) (-3.41) 
PPE(Net) t-1 0.068*** 0.008 0.024** 0.008*** -0.001 
 (3.01) (0.54) (2.25) (6.57) (-0.07) 
Foreign Income t-1 1.219*** 0.541*** 0.269*** 0.099*** 0.360*** 
 (9.91) (5.76) (6.35) (8.70) (13.90) 
TA t 0.465*** 0.222*** -0.128*** 0.021*** 0.700*** 
 (10.76) (7.35) (-5.45) (4.62) (30.18) 
GSP Growth t 0.113 0.091 -0.062* 0.013 0.013 
 (0.80) (0.80) (-1.63) (1.26) (0.42) 
Unemployment t -1.139** -1.004*** -0.275** -0.074*** -0.078 
 (-2.29) (-2.68) (-2.14) (-3.35) (-0.87) 
      
Observations 89,693 89,693 89,693 89,693 89,693 
Adjusted R-squared 0.756 0.799 0.786 0.332 0.685 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents baseline firm-level difference-in-difference estimates using state tax rate increases as 
plausibly exogenous treatments. We use five dependent variables from firms’ income statements to measure 
incidence on various stakeholders. Sales is constructed as sales divided by lagged assets. COGS is constructed as the 
cost of goods sold divided by lagged assets. SG&A is constructed as sales, general and administrative expenses 
divided by lagged assets. Non-state Taxes is total tax expense minus federal tax expense scaled by lagged assets. Net 
Income is net income scaled by lagged assets. In each specification, we use various state-level measured at t and 
firm-level controls measured at t-1. All control variables are defined in Appendix A. We use firm fixed effects to 
remove fixed within-firm variation over time, state fixed effects to remove state-wide shocks and year fixed effects 
to remove annual, economy-wide shocks. Fixed effects are omitted for parsimony. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level, following the suggestions in Petersen (2009). One-sided 
t-tests are performed on our Increase and Decrease variables, except when Sales is the dependent variable. t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
